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Over the past two decades, the European Union (EU) has become a central actor in financial regulation and 
developed complex institutions to fulfill its roles. Pre-financial crisis scholarship has provided key insights 
into the functioning of this institutional cobweb and its evolution over time. However, the financial crisis has 
highlighted four facets of EU financial regulation (EUFR) that deserve more scholarly attention than they have 
received so far: (1) the permissive pre-crisis consensus on the merits of financial liberalization and integration, 
(2) the embeddedness of financial regulation in the political economy of EU integration at large, (3) preference 
formation of public and private stakeholders in EUFR, and (4) the global economic and regulatory context of 
EUFR. This paper presents the key scholarly challenges across these four areas. Addressing them promises not 
only academic insights but also promotes the relevance of EUFR research for real-world policy dilemmas.
Daniel Mügge is an assistant professor at the Universiteit van Amsterdam, The Netherlands. He can be reached at 
d.k.muegge@uva.nl. 
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Introduction
In the decade prior to the financial crisis, European 
Union (EU) institutions such as the Commission 
have become central players in financial regulation, 
both vis-à-vis member states and on the global stage. 
In response, EU financial regulation (EUFR) has 
emerged as a distinct field of study that has analyzed 
regulatory and institutional reforms and the drivers 
behind them. Beginning in 2007, the financial crisis 
triggered a wave of reforms on the national and Eu-
ropean level, including temporary short-term mea-
sures. For several years, scholars of EUFR had their 
hands full simply keeping up with current events 
(e.g. Quaglia, Eastwood and Holmes 2009). With 
key EU regulatory responses now in place, time has 
come to take a step back and assess how the maturing 
of EUFR as a research field on the one hand and the 
financial crisis on the other have spawned new ques-
tions and hence reshaped the research agenda (cf. for 
financial governance more generally Helleiner and 
Pagliari 2011).
 The financial crisis has inspired research-
ers across the social sciences in general, as a stroll 
through any academic bookshop will readily reveal 
(Lo 2012). To avoid intellectual overstretch, the sug-
gestions for fruitful research avenues laid out below 
are limited in three respects: they concentrate on the 
role of the European Union in financial regulation 
rather than on individual member states. They ignore 
the financial fire-fighting during the crisis through 
crucial but short-lived policies (for example bans on 
short-selling). And the choice of focal points is in-
evitably subjective, which is not meant to deny the 
potential relevance of those not discussed here. This 
paper highlights four themes to structure the discus-
sion:
(1) Pre-crisis evolution of EUFR was dependent on 
a permissive consensus regarding the benefits of 
EU financial integration. The shattering of this 
consensus has generated new questions, both 
about past scholarly insights and about the future 
evolution of policy and institutions.
(2) In particular, the role of financial regulation in the 
political economy of EU integration as a whole 
remains insufficiently understood. In the first in-
stance, this concerns the place of financial mar-
kets in economic projects such as the creation of 
the single European market or the Lisbon agenda. 
But financial regulation has also interacted with 
other policy areas in less obvious and planned 
ways. Fiscal policy is one example: cheap house-
hold credit delivered through deregulated finan-
cial markets has relieved fiscal pressures (Crouch 
2009); ensuing financial crises have burdened 
public budgets. Such links matter greatly to anal-
yses of regulatory policy, but they have thus far 
been underappreciated by EUFR scholars.
(3) Before the crisis, the policy preferences among 
public and private stakeholders in financial regu-
lation appeared relatively stable and hence self-
evident to scholars. Ceteris paribus, policymakers 
championed cheap credit, and competitive firms 
cheered unfettered cross-border market access. 
As stakeholders have been forced to reassess 
these and other policy stances, their preference 
formation deserves much more theoretical at-
tention. How do public and private stakeholders 
make sense of the regulatory options they face?
(4) Finally, in its attempts to reregulate financial 
markets, the EU faces constraints in globally mo-
bile capital and financial services, and global op-
portunities in unprecedented levels of regulatory 
cooperation. On top, EU policymakers are em-
bedded in transnational policy networks that may 
channel new regulatory ideas, both from else-
where into the EU and vice versa. Taken together, 
these factors make the global context central to 
understanding EU policy and its efficacy.
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After a review of recent EUFR scholarship, 
this paper will set out the core questions for each of 
these four areas, arguing that answering them will 
help addressing the real-world regulatory challenges 
that the crisis has revealed so clearly.
The EU as a mature power in financial regulation
Since the late 1990s, EU scholars have clarified key 
aspects of financial regulation in the EU. It is largely 
undisputed that supranational bodies now play cen-
tral roles in EUFR, such that their actions and im-
pact are not reducible to bargaining between member 
states. The European Commission stands out. But the 
European financial authorities that have emerged in 
2011 out of the Lamfalussy committees also mat-
ter in both the formulation and the implementation 
of policy (Moloney 2011a, Moloney 2011b). While 
financial regulation is not an exclusive EU compe-
tence, few of its facets remain untouched by binding 
European rules.
 As scholars have discarded the obsolete di-
chotomy between supranationalism and intergov-
ernmentalism, they have revealed the real-world 
complexity of policymaking in this domain (Quaglia 
2007). Since the early 2000s, the European Parlia-
ment, the Council and the Commission have been 
complemented by new comitology committees, 
regulatory networks (the Lamfalussy committees), 
regulatory committees for accounting and auditing, 
as well as numerous sounding boards and advisory 
committees (Moloney 2010, Mügge 2010, Quaglia 
2010). Scholarship on the first wave of EU financial 
regulatory integration was firmly rooted in political 
economy analyses (Coleman 1996, Story and Walter 
1997, Underhill 1997): member state governments 
battled each other over market access abroad for their 
own firms. But as policy competences have moved to 
supranational bodies, and the institutional web has 
grown thicker, the emphasis has shifted towards con-
ceptual apparatuses common in other fields of EU 
regulatory competence, such as airlines, telecoms, 
environmental, health and safety standards (Quaglia, 
De Francesco and Raedelli 2008).
 This institutionalist scholarship has intro-
duced new drivers behind and obstacles to the fur-
ther evolution of regulatory integration (Thatcher 
and Coen 2008): rational institutionalism has high-
lighted veto players, and historical institutionalists 
have pointed to path dependency and sequencing 
(e.g. Bach and Newman 2010). The complexity of 
financial regulation has spawned expert committees 
in which bargaining has partially been supplanted 
by genuine deliberation about appropriate answers 
to regulatory challenges (Quaglia 2008). Indeed, 
because many institutional innovations have defied 
categorization as either EU committees or inter-gov-
ernmental bodies, their study as (transgovernmental) 
regulatory networks has gained traction (Baker 2010, 
Posner 2010, Maggetti and Gilardi 2011).
The pre-crisis consensus revisited
The pre-crisis shift in emphasis from intergovern-
mental bargaining to committee governance and 
from powering over market access to puzzling over 
best practice has mirrored the real-world evolution 
of policymaking in EUFR.  With the benefit of hind-
sight, however, it is clear that this shift was tempo-
rary and not, as much pre-crisis work had assumed, 
a secular trend.
 Scholars of EU finance had commonly as-
sumed that market integration and the institutional 
evolution supporting it would continue into the fore-
seeable future. The Lamfalussy-reforms had made 
clear that institutional innovation need not imply 
exclusive supranational competences, and that net-
worked forms of governance, with divided compe-
tences between national and supranational bodies, 
could equally aid market integration. And in spite of 
their differences, European political elites agreed on 
the merits of pan-European financial integration and 
the necessity of legislative activity to spawn it (Grahl 
and Teague 2005, Donnelly 2010).
 Key hallmarks of pre-crisis financial regula-
tion followed from this consensus: first, agreement 
on the desirability and overall direction of financial 
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integration allowed significant delegation of rule-
making to non-majoritarian bodies prone to eluding 
principals’ control. Second, financial regulation was 
hardly politicized among European citizens. Bu-
reaucrats and experts could work with little external 
scrutiny. Regulatory networks as detached policy 
spaces flourished in this environment. Third, in the 
prevailing pro-financial industry climate this depo-
liticization produced dense ties between policymak-
ers and the financial industry. Finally, the prevailing 
consensus championed not only financial integration 
throughout the EU, but also further financial inno-
vation and securitization. Agreement on their merits 
allowed regulators to coordinate regulatory details 
while sidestepping principled debates about the ap-
propriate place of finance in contemporary societies.
 The financial crisis has shaken this pro-in-
tegration consensus. The extent of ideational dam-
age is yet unclear, but it clearly affects the agenda of 
EUFR research. At the very least, post-crisis gover-
nance may exhibit dynamics different from those be-
fore the crisis. Additional stakeholders have entered 
debates about financial regulation, for example trade 
unions or advocacy networks like the Brussels-based 
FinanceWatch. Such developments need not invali-
date insights about pre-crisis governance. But they 
highlight their contingency on benign market condi-
tions and on a permissive societal consensus favor-
ing regulatory liberalism (Gamble 2009). They also 
challenge scholars to develop conceptual tools that 
capture key facets of post-crisis governance, laid out 
further below.
 Indeed, the crisis shifts our attention towards 
this permissive consensus itself. The operation of 
pre-crisis governance depended on the reproduction 
of beliefs about the inner workings of financial mar-
kets and, flowing from that, the desirability of cross-
border market integration and regulatory liberalism. 
At the time, these ideas seemed natural not only to 
most policymakers, but also to the scholars study-
ing the latter. Now we ask to what degree this belief 
system was sustained by ideational or institutional 
inertia or by specific material interests. To be clear, 
the task is not to demonstrate the dominance of either 
ideas or interests in isolation (cf. Sil and Katzenstein 
2010), but to understand their mutual constitution – a 
perennial social-scientific quest – through the study 
of pre-crisis EUFR.
 Going one step further still, has the consensus 
surrounding regulatory liberalism and supranational 
integration contributed to the crisis itself? More spe-
cifically, to what degree have the pre-crisis evolution 
of EU financial markets and their governance been 
wound up in the build-up of financial vulnerabilities 
that were unsustainable and would necessarily col-
lapse? The supranationalization of EU financial reg-
ulation has been intimately connected to regulatory 
liberalism as a reform program (Mügge 2010). But if 
the pre-crisis evolution of EU financial governance 
was part and parcel of what some scholars have 
called financialization (for a comparison of Euro-
pean countries, see Stockhammer 2007), the shift in 
political dynamics associated with the crisis may not 
have been an exogenous shock but an endogenous 
one. Was the pre-crisis mode of governance neces-
sarily unsustainable because it systematically gener-
ated overly lax and hence unsustainable policy? The 
suggested causal chain is long, meaning that careful 
empirical research will be necessary to establish its 
validity. But both its practical and its theoretical im-
plications are too significant to dismiss or accept it 
without thorough assessment.
The political economy of EU financial regulation
The role of EUFR in the build-up of economic vul-
nerability in Europe is exemplary of a more encom-
passing research agenda: the place of financial regu-
lation in the political economy of EU integration as 
a whole. Three sets of questions in particular arise.
 First, who have been the winners and los-
ers of regulatory reform? This question was a minor 
concern when by and large there seemed to be only 
winners, and when political dissent against financial 
liberalization was minimal. Distributive questions 
about financial regulation arise around the globe, but 
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Europe is particularly fruitful to explore them: com-
parable rules have been rolled out across the continent 
over the past decade, influencing for example credit 
availability to households and small businesses, pat-
terns of government borrowing, and financial sector 
restructuring. With the diverse political economies it 
combines under one regulatory roof, the EU is a per-
fect environment to study comparatively the impact 
of regulatory reforms and the factors that condition 
it. The identification of net winners and losers are an 
important part of that agenda.
 Analyses of such issues will have to heed a 
second insight that (re-)emerged from the crisis: fi-
nance is special. As regulatory battles unfolded in 
EUFR over the past decades, scholars of European 
Studies have often compared them to developments 
in other regulatory arenas such as telecoms, utilities 
and airlines. Financial regulation was not seen pri-
marily as an instrument to shape the flow and accu-
mulation of credit and debt, but as a tool to channel 
financial services – commodities not fundamentally 
different from, say, transport services.
 The crisis has reminded us that, while par-
allels exist with other regulatory fields, finance is 
not just another business sector. Financial markets 
pervade the economic fabric of advanced industrial 
societies. That entails linkages with fiscal and mon-
etary policy. Developments in other economic do-
mains (for example real estate or energy markets) 
impinge on financial market functioning. In this re-
spect, finance is more complicated than a sector such 
as telecoms. And its range of stakeholders is much 
broader, both of actors who are affected and of those 
who seek to bend regulation to their advantage.
 In consequence, EUFR scholarship stands to 
gain from a deeper engagement with financial eco-
nomics and sociology in its various forms. Delving 
into actual financial market functioning is inevitable 
when assessing whether regulation is meaningful. 
Scholars used to share a vague sense (and hence re-
fused to define precisely) what made regulation for 
example ‘intrusive’, ‘successful’, ‘liberal’, ‘market-
friendly’ or ‘effective’. None of these qualities are 
self-evident anymore, and EUFR scholars will need 
to draw on the substantive debates to define what 
they mean when they use these labels.
 Also financial regulators themselves have be-
come much more uncertain about the nature of the 
animal they try to tame (Financial Services Author-
ity 2009).1 Their regulatory challenges may be so in-
tractable as to prevent sweeping reform. But in order 
to assess whether reforms are wide-ranging or only 
amount to tinkering at the margins we need a clear 
yardstick: what is the realm of plausible reform? 
Given post-crisis disagreement on this point, EUFR 
scholars themselves will have to judge regulatory 
content. Engagement with the substance of financial 
regulation, not only the process of its creation, is im-
perative.
 Zooming out once more, scholars of both in-
ternational and comparative political economy have 
long debated whether advanced industrialized coun-
tries have converged around liberal political-eco-
nomic arrangements.2 The EU Commission itself had 
regularly portrayed the USA and its financial markets 
as examples worth emulating, and it used legislation 
to promote cross-border financial integration and fi-
nancial disintermediation. The resultant evolution of 
EUFR chimed with a putative neo-liberal trend in the 
European economy as a whole. But these links were 
rarely explored in detail. Convergence-arguments 
often relied on structural explanatory factors such 
as capital mobility (Glyn 2006), the spread of tech-
nology or the dominance of particular class inter-
ests (Bieling 2003, Bieling 2006, Macartney 2009). 
In contrast, EUFR scholarship had mostly zoomed 
in and traced institutional complexity and context-
specific constellations of interests in a circumscribed 
1  The introduction of the Turner review is ex-
emplary of this debate, as are the various discussion 
forums hosted by the Financial Times, arguably the 
most important newspaper in this field.
2  The debate is much more nuanced than this 
proposition suggests; its gist – convergence towards 
an Anglo-Saxon model or not – has remained intact 
nevertheless. 
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circle of stakeholders.
 So how does EUFR fit into the more encom-
passing transformations of European economies over 
the past decades? Has it been a driver, enabling fi-
nancialization to arise (Stockhammer 2007)? Has 
it been a corollary (and Achilles heel) of a general 
neo-liberal trend in the European economy, without 
direct causal significance? And if the intellectual 
climate in Europe is turning against neo-liberalism, 
however ill-defined, what does that imply for the fu-
ture of regulatory politics in European finance?
Preference formation in financial regulation
One particularly useful way of approaching this ques-
tion is to pry open the preference formation of key 
stakeholders in EU financial regulation. Most pre-
crisis research was content with assuming seemingly 
obvious preferences: ceteris paribus, EU politicians 
favored cross-border financial integration because 
of the economic benefits it offered. Commission bu-
reaucrats cheered supranational integration because 
it put policy competences in their hands and because 
they believed in the merits of European integration 
(Posner 2009). And globally, great regulatory pow-
ers pushed their own rules largely to reap the benefits 
of cross-border integration without having to impose 
adjustment costs on domestic financial players (Sim-
mons 2001, Drezner 2007).
 Private-actor preferences were also con-
sidered unproblematic. Financial institutions with 
sufficient size or a competitive edge championed 
cross-border integration for commercial reasons, so 
the assumption (Mügge 2010). Smaller firms tended 
to resist integration, following the same reasoning. 
Additional axes of conflicting commercial interests 
could be added to the big versus small-divide: the 
UK government eagerly defended the preeminence 
of the City in EU financial markets against German 
and French attempts to boost Frankfurt and Paris 
(Story and Walter 1997, Underhill 1997, Mügge 
2010).3 And firms with competing business-models 
3  It remains an open question whether the 
Continental member states have favoured stricter 
(for example regulated stock exchanges and univer-
sal banks) clashed over regulation that would privi-
lege one or the other (for the case of the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive, see Ferrarini and 
Recine 2006).
  Post-crisis, the role of financial firms in 
policymaking is still high on the scholarly agenda 
(Mosley and Singer 2009). But whereas stakehold-
ers’ preferences have long been portrayed as self-
evident and in no need of fine-grained theorizing, the 
crisis has exposed the frailty of the belief systems 
underpinning them. For example, while Buckley and 
Howarth (2011) analyze EU hedge fund regulation 
largely as a battle of the financial industry against 
intrusive regulation, Quaglia (2011b) argues that 
differing ideas about appropriate intervention have 
played a key role, too. 
 While it is evident that, as in other domains of 
IPE (Woll 2008, Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons 2010), 
ideas and interests are linked also in battles over EU 
financial regulation (Quaglia 2010), it remains un-
clear how so. With the defects of regulatory liberal-
ism in plain sight and financial markets highly vola-
tile, how do financial firms redefine their regulatory 
preferences (cf. Leblond 2008)? How deeply have 
pre-crisis ideas among regulators been shaken, and 
how do other ideas move in their place? Do we see a 
growing convergence of ideas, as puzzling over new 
regulatory directions is now a collective European 
enterprise in supranational bodies and networks? Or 
do they diverge, as the crisis permits divergent regu-
latory conclusions to be drawn from it? How do poli-
ticians redefine policy-preferences in light of both 
cognitive uncertainty and (temporary) politicization 
of financial governance? And how do citizens, which 
never before were a force to be reckoned with in fi-
nancial governance, form opinions about desirable 
policy changes and make their voices heard?
regulation for ideational reasons or to hurt the City 
and thereby promote their own financial centres and 
firms. A specific example is the Alternative Invest-
ment Fund Managers Directive (Buckley and How-
arth 2011).
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The global context
To be sure, just as citizens may reclaim a say in fi-
nancial market regulation, policymakers may find 
themselves facing tighter global constraints than 
ever before.  After three decades of liberalization, 
both financial markets and their governance are too 
globalized to allow ignoring what happens elsewhere 
in the world. Following Helleiner and Pagliari (2011) 
and Cohen (2006: 32), Europe’s ability to shape its 
own financial future thus depends both on power-as-
autonomy (from external constraints) and on power-
as-influence (the ability to bend global regulatory 
agreements to one’s own will).
 The constraints come in two varieties. The 
cross-border mobility of financial services and capi-
tal shapes policymakers’ choices, for better or worse, 
even if this mobility is itself an artifact of permissive 
regulations and hence subject to political manipula-
tion. Debates about the influence of globalization 
on national policy resurface, this time with financial 
regulation instead of welfare state regimes and taxa-
tion as their object. Competition for capital and fi-
nancial services revenue, with its tendency to spawn 
lax standards, is counterbalanced by the danger of 
financial instability and contagion, the second key 
constraint (cf. Singer 2007). The negative externali-
ties of financial crises boost the case for global coop-
eration. The balance the EU strikes between compet-
itive and cooperative imperatives will be a key factor 
shaping future regulatory reform.
 At first sight, the incentives for cooperation 
have grown over the past years as EU power-as-influ-
ence in financial affairs has waxed. Most noticeably, 
the regulatory one-way traffic that transatlantic rule 
harmonization used to be (Simmons 2001) has given 
way to rules travelling in both directions – from the 
US to Europe and vice versa (e.g. Posner 2009, Eb-
erle and Lauter 2011). Scholarship investigating this 
shift has taken market size as its starting point (cf. 
Drezner 2007): states’ control over domestic market 
access is their principal bargaining chip in interna-
tional regulatory coordination. The concentration of 
European regulatory competences in supranational 
hands substitutes one giant financial market for more 
than two dozen much smaller ones (Posner 2009). 
EU bargaining power rises, even if the relationship is 
not linear (Mügge 2011).4
 On top, it matters whether players in global 
coordination efforts bring regulatory capacity to the 
table (Bach and Newman 2007): ceteris paribus, EU 
influence has grown when it has been able to demon-
strate expertise, experience and the capacity to im-
plement policies effectively at home. Taken together, 
market size, the level of regulatory centralization and 
regulatory capacity are clearly useful when gauging 
the EUs role in global financial governance (cf. Qua-
glia 2011a). 
 Also in global financial governance, howev-
er, the crisis has shaken matters up. Pre-crisis work 
had largely assumed that global regulatory harmo-
nization would progress for the foreseeable future; 
the key question was which rules would prevail. Yet 
as Bieling (2006) anticipated, economic troubles in 
both Europe and the USA have weakened the intel-
lectual case and domestic support base for further 
harmonization. How then has the crisis changed the 
global context for EUFR?
  For Helleiner and Pagliari (2011), the inclu-
sion of non-OECD countries in the G20, in the Fi-
nancial Stability Board and in the Basle Committee 
on Banking Supervision has ended the Euro-Ameri-
can dominance in global financial governance. But 
just as new countries have taken their seats in regu-
latory forums, the appetite for global harmonization 
has weakened, potentially undoing their new-found 
influence in global finance. Sidestepping binding 
global agreements, the EU and the USA may mutu-
ally adapt their rules bilaterally (for example in de-
rivatives and credit rating agency regulation) as they 
did before the crisis, and relegate the G20 and the 
FSB to a much more modest global role than the two 
bodies had been promised.
4  Note that the concentration of regulatory 
competences swings free of its success in spawning 
actual market integration (Grossman and Leblond 
2011).
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 This scenario reemphasizes the importance of 
two factors highlighted above: preference formation 
and the economic embeddedness of financial regula-
tion. The question of preference formation is straight-
forward: what motivates regulatory authorities to 
seek international harmonization or adaptation? Past 
scholarship focused on the trade-off between finan-
cial stability and domestic firms’ competitiveness 
(Singer 2007). Upon closer inspection, however, the 
EU’s motivation to seek international regulatory in-
fluence is unclear (Posner and Véron 2010). Does it 
promote a European blueprint for global rules to aid 
financial stability, potentially flowing from the more 
coordinated market model prevalent on the Conti-
nent? Do financial sector interests dominate in the 
end, causing a focus on the transatlantic axis? Or 
does the EU pursue power for its own sake? Adjudi-
cation between these claims will require much more 
detailed empirical analyses than we have so far. 
  The EU’s influence is not confined to its 
muscle in international bargaining. Financial gover-
nance is populated by organizations that resist ready 
categorization as either private or public (Porter 
2005, Büthe and Mattli 2011). Examples include the 
International Accounting Standards Board, the In-
ternational Organization of Securities Commissions 
and the International Swaps and Derivatives Asso-
ciation. Very different from great power politics, EU 
influence in these bodies lends itself rather to prin-
cipal-agent analysis (Leblond 2011, Mügge 2011). 
The complex patterns of delegation – from member 
states to regulators and EU officials, and from them 
to hybrid standard setters – are yet to be fully ex-
plored and understood. Are intra-European divisions 
an impediment to a strong global presence? Or do 
they allow Europe to play two-level games and boost 
its external influence?
 Finally, the EU may shape regulation around 
the world through leadership by example. At present, 
global financial governance develops not towards 
full-fledged rule harmonization but to more complex 
patterns of policy coordination (Helleiner and Pa-
gliari 2011). If decentralized coordination emerges 
as a key mode of policy evolution, the EU may con-
stitute an enormous repository of blueprints that fa-
cilitate cooperation without trampling national sov-
ereignty (Sabel and Zeitlin 2011). Examples include 
institutionalized opportunities for mutual learning, 
peer review of policy progress, and a focus on the 
achievement of overall goals rather than adherence 
to detailed scripts (Posner 2010).
 Whether such modes of policy evolution will 
flourish hinges on the degree to which divergent 
stakeholder interests and macro-economic develop-
ments redraw the global economic map. As govern-
ments discover how financial regulation impinges on 
economic policy more generally, their appetite for 
coordination may wane further. Once the sovereign 
debt crisis dust settles and real interest rates return to 
normal levels, the European financial sector may be 
so damaged that regulatory protectionism, not global 
harmonization, will reign supreme. In addition to un-
derstanding better EU financial regulation in its own 
right, we will have to appreciate how, as one of many 
interlinked facets of global economic governance, it 
is at the mercy of a global economic re-shuffle whose 
endpoint is still unclear.
Conclusion: the real-world relevance of EUFR re-
search
EUFR research derives its ultimate value not from 
its theoretical sophistication but from its real-world 
relevance. The questions that animate its agenda are 
straightforward: which factors shape how Europe 
governs its financial markets? And how are we to 
evaluate policy output? Such assessment hinges on 
the constraints policymakers face: is policy dogged 
by institutional complexity or bureaucratic inertia, hi-
jacked by corporate interests or populist politicians? 
Are policymakers shortsighted in failing to nurture 
global rule harmonization? Or is Europe served bet-
ter by going it alone? Do policymakers cling to ob-
solete ideas, ignoring opportunities to learn from re-
forms elsewhere?
 Already, EUFR scholars command key in-
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sights to address such questions. Their understanding 
of institutional dynamics stands out in this respect. 
Other factors deserve additional attention. This es-
say has emphasized four out of a long list of candi-
dates: the pre-crisis consensus surrounding financial 
integration and liberalization, financial regulation’s 
interaction with other economic policies, stakehold-
ers’ preference formation, and the global regulatory 
context. Studying these will help answer a question 
about which both citizens and policymakers agonize 
these days: can Europe deliver? Scholars of finance 
never tire to point out that financial regulation is 
worth studying because of its enormous impact on 
citizens’ lives. If that is indeed the case, it is impera-
tive to spell out more clearly which forms of gover-
nance deserve our support, and which ones do not.
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